Order backlogs and strategic pricing: the case of the U.S. large turbine generator industry
通过博弈论分析生产积压下的价格竞争，预测订单积压与相对价格的关系，并用1951-1963年美国大型涡轮发电机市场数据验证，对研究战略定价的管理者有用。
This paper illustrates the usefulness of game theory for strategic management through theoretical and empirical analysis of price competition in the presence of production backlogs. Game-theoretic analysis predicts a different relationship between relative prices and backlog levels than does analysis that ignores the sorts of interactive considerations emphasized by game theory. Empirical analysis based on data for the U.S. market for large turbine generators between 1951 and 1963 corroborates the game-theoretic prediction. The paper concludes with a discussion of the sorts of situations in which game-theoretic reasoning is particularly likely to prove useful. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.