Centralized Wage Setting and Monetary Policy in a Reputational Equilibrium
分析中央银行与集中工会之间的重复博弈，探讨在无法承诺时，声誉机制如何维持非通胀均衡，并指出其性质与竞争性劳动市场情形不同。
This paper analyzes a repeated game between the central bank and a centralized trade union. The central bank would be better off if it could commit to a noninflationary strategy. When this commitment is not enforceable, a noninflationary equilibrium can still be sustained by a reputational mechanism if the central bank has superior information about its own objective function. The qualitative properties of this reputational equilibrium are shown to differ from the cases considered in the existing literature where the central bank was modeled as playing a game against competitive labor markets. Copyright 1988 by Ohio State University Press.