On the Economics of Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law
用更严谨的方法重新审视最低工资法的合规与执法问题，纠正并调和了此前关于最低工资与市场工资差距、劳动力需求弹性和罚款威慑作用等问题的矛盾结论，并首次将法律规避（降低工资）和法律回避（调整就业）纳入分析。
This paper reexamines the issues of compliance with and enforcement of the minimum wage law recently addressed in this Journal by Ashenfelter and Smith and by Grenier. Pursuing a more rigorous methodology we are able to add new general conclusions, and correct and reconcile some previous conflicting conclusions concerning the role of the disparity between the minimum and free market wages, the level and elasticity of labor demand, and the magnitude of deterring monetary sanctions on the noncompliance decision. Our formulation also addresses the law evasion (reduced wages) as well as the law avoidance (modified employment) aspects of the noncompliance decision, which previous formulations have ignored.