THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE*
评估欧盟和美国并购法中破产企业抗辩的福利影响，结合寡头模型与内生估值拍卖模型，发现该抗辩对消费者效果尚可，但可能因“最小竞争威胁”条件导致总剩余损失，并在多企业环境下增加掠夺动机。
This paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm defense (FFD) in the EU and U.S. merger laws. To this end, I combine an oligopoly model with an ‘endogenous valuations’ auction model. The FFD is shown to work reasonably well for consumers unless small firms are too small. The FFD may, however, lead to total surplus losses, due to a ‘least danger to competition’ (LDC) condition which favors small, and thus possibly inefficient, firms. It is also shown that, in a multi-firm setting, the FFD increases the incentive for predation only when the assets are industry-specific.