Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
比较了代理人获取信息时机不同时委托人的收益，发现两结果情形下委托人更偏好知情代理人，但多结果时结论不成立，并给出了代理人努力负效用不同时的偏好条件。
This paper compares the principal's payoff in agency models under different assumptions about the agent's access to information. The agent may make decisions before (is uninformed) or after (is informed) learning the state of nature. When there are two possible outcomes, the principal typically prefers informed to uninformed agents, whether the agent receives the information before or after contracting. This result is false when there are more than two outcomes. Conditions under which a principal prefers one agent to another, when the agents differ only in their disutility of effort, are also given. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.