The Evolution of Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Transition Economies: The Case of Sellier and Bellot in the Czech Republic
以捷克弹药制造商Sellier and Bellot为例，研究转型经济中公司治理的演变，指出法律、资本市场和会计缺陷阻碍了最优治理的采用，并证明监督和激励机制能创造价值。
Abstract This paper investigates the evolution of corporate governance and firm performance in transition economies. It focuses on barriers that impeded adoption of optimal corporate governance at Czech ammunition manufacturer Sellier and Bellot (S&B) following voucher privatisation in 1993. Exogenously imposed diffuse ownership, combined with legal, capital market, and accounting deficiencies, contributed to poor corporate governance and weak firm performance. This study shows how legal, capital market, and accounting deficiencies hinder corporate governance evolution; it demonstrates monitoring and incentive mechanisms can create value in transition economies; it suggests effective privatisation not only involves rapid ownership transfer but careful accounting and securities regulation and legal protection.