Corporate Raiders, Performance and Governance in Europe
分析1990至2001年间欧洲企业掠夺者的136次大宗股权购买，发现市场对公告反应积极，掠夺者卖出时获得超额收益，但未改善目标公司经营绩效，不支持其作为治理推动者的假设。
Abstract I analyse 136 block purchases made by corporate raiders in Europe between 1990 and 2001. Contrary to the hypothesis that these investors expropriate the target companies, there is a positive market reaction to the first public announcement of these purchases. In the long‐run, raiders earn an abnormal profit when they sell their stakes. When they still held their positions at the end of the sample period, abnormal returns were insignificant. Raiders' activities do not improve operating performance. The findings are consistent with superior stock picking ability among these investors, but do not support the hypothesis that raiders are governance champions.