Accidental Death and the Rule of Joint and Several Liability
研究美国各州从连带责任转向按份责任改革的效果，发现改革通过激励深口袋被告将无支付能力被告告上法庭，反而提高了预防水平，降低了多种意外事故的死亡率。
Most U.S. states have enacted JSL reform, the move from a regime of joint and several liability (JSL) that allows plaintiffs to claim full recovery from any one of multiple defendants to one where defendants are held liable only for the harm they cause. Contrary to previous theoretical work, we show that JSL reform can increase precaution by judgment proof agent by giving “deep pockets” an incentive to reduce their own liability by bringing judgment‐proof agents into court. This result can help explain our empirical findings showing that JSL reform reduces death rates (and hence increase precaution) for many types of accidents. Together, these results highlight the role that litigation costs and judgment‐proof agents play in the functioning of the American tort system .