Testing and the Composition of the Labor Pool
研究企业通过测试筛选工人时，测试精度与劳动力池中工人整体质量之间的互补关系，发现这种互补性可能导致多重均衡。
Abstract We consider a continuous‐time labor matching model with endogenous separation. Firms initially lack information about the quality of workers with whom they are matched. They acquire information both from pre‐employment testing and, in the case in which a labor relationship is established, on‐the‐job performance. Testing provides a signal of a worker's quality. A firm can pick the accuracy level of its test, but it pays a cost that increases in the accuracy. Workers who perform poorly on the test are not offered employment; those who perform poorly on the job are eventually fired (after some delay). Worker quality is not match‐specific; low‐quality workers are less productive with all firms. We show that, in equilibrium, there is an inverse and complementary relation between the level of testing that firms optimally perform and the overall quality of the workers in the matching pool. We consider the properties of a steady‐state, stable equilibrium in such an environment. The complementarity between testing and the composition of the unemployed pool introduces the possibility of multiple equilibria.