Market Power, Information and Efficiency: The Link Between Solutions and Equilibrium Distortions
研究了竞争程度如何影响信息不对称导致的扭曲位置和程度，发现代理人拥有私人信息时，竞争加剧会提高代理人福利但损害委托人，且委托人总损失可能超过代理人总收益，降低总剩余。
The extent of competition generally determines both the location and the extent of distortions due to information asymmetries. When agents have private information, increased competition raises agent welfare at the expense of uninformed principals. Nevertheless, increased competition among principals may lower total surplus: the losses sustained by principals as a group exceed the benefits realized by agents as a group when there is a sufficiently large proportion of agents with high cost of agent effort. These results are independent of the correlation between the agent's marginal cost and the principal's marginal benefit of agent effort. Copyright 1993 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.