Fiscal and monetary policy co‐ordination: A differential game approach
用微分博弈分析意大利财政部与央行在合作与非合作下的互动，计算纳什和斯塔克尔伯格非合作均衡，并比较纳什与Kalai-Smorodinsky讨价还价模型，发现政府议价能力更强，且非合作的弊端不止于收益损失。
Abstract In this paper the interaction between the Treasury and the central bank is examined in the case of both cooperative and non‐cooperative behaviour. Differential games are used in the framework of a continuous‐time econometric model of the Italian economy. The Nash and the Stackelberg non‐cooperative equilibrium solutions are computed, and the case for cooperation is analysed by considering the Nash and the Kalai‐Smorodinsky bargaining models. It is shown that, in the Italian case, the government has a stronger bargaining position than the central bank. A comparison is then made between the different solutions to show that the drawbacks that emerge from non‐cooperation are not simply those depending on the players' payoffs. Other features are in fact considered which constitute a further argument for policy co‐ordination.