INCENTIVES AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ENTERPRISES IN ECONOMIC TRANSITION: CAPITAL MARKETS ARE NOT ENOUGH
研究东欧经济转型中如何构建企业治理的激励与约束机制，指出仅靠私有化和资本市场不足以约束低效管理层，还需考虑债权人、员工等利益相关者的作用，并以东德和波兰为例说明政府需积极干预。
This article considers enterprise behavior during the process of restructuring in Eastern Europe. It is concerned with how to construct controls and incentives for efficient management behavior. By themselves, privatization and freely functioning capital markets (specifically markets for shares) will be inadequate to discipline inefficient management. Therefore the disciplines imposed by other stakeholders--creditors and the workforce--are also considered. After surveying the theoretical arguments underlying these issues, the article contrasts the progress of restructuring in Eastern Germany and Poland. It argues that the governments of former command economies will have to intervene actively to influence the future management of their enterprises. Meanwhile, whatever long-term outcomes emerge, in the short term failures of corporate control are in danger of resulting in highly perverse responses to orthodox macroeconomic policies. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.