Optimal Unemployment Insurance in a Matching Equilibrium
在均衡匹配框架下研究最优失业保险，比较了战略谈判与标准纳什谈判的结果，并发现协调政策（同时优化就业补贴和失业保险）比仅按期限调整保险支付能带来更大福利收益。
This article considers optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in an equilibrium matching framework where wages are determined by strategic bargaining. It compares the outcome with the standard Nash bargaining approach, which can be interpreted as union wage bargaining with an insider/outsider distortion. It also shows that a coordinated policy approach, one that chooses job creation subsidies and UI optimally, generates a much greater welfare gain than a policy that simply varies UI payments by duration. © 2006 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.