To Violate or Not Violate the Law: An Example from Egyptian Agriculture
利用Logit和Probit模型分析埃及两个村庄中农民违反棉花土地分配和水稻配额法律的经济因素，发现违法者往往更贫穷、拥有更少土地和牲畜，且更靠近自由市场。
Abstract Egyptian agriculture is heavily regulated by laws and administrative regulations. This paper explores some of the economic implications of two laws that are widely violated: the land allotment to cotton and the imposed quota for rice. Logit and probit models are utilized to assess factors which are associated with law violations in two villages. Violators of both laws tend to be poorer, have less owned land, have fewer number of land pieces, have fewer cattle, and are located nearer the free village markets than the nonviolators.