竞赛中的风险厌恶

Risk Aversion in Contests

Economic Journal · 1995
被引 139
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

研究竞赛中风险厌恶程度对获胜概率的影响,发现有限责任下更风险厌恶者更易获胜,无有限责任时结果不确定,而按努力分享奖品时风险厌恶不影响结果。

Abstract

In a contest, participants spend money or effort to increase their chances of winning a prize. We examine primarily the following question: Could the timid (the more risk averse) have a better chance of winning in contests? Under limited liability the answer is always positive. In the absence of limited liability there is no single answer, whereas when the prize is shared as a function of effort the outcome is independent of the contestants' risk aversion. We also relate our results to self-protection and examine some other implications of risk aversion.

风险厌恶竞赛有限责任自我保护