Trade-ins and Introductory Offers in a Monopoly
建模了准耐用品市场中针对老客户的以旧换新折扣和新客户优惠，分析其跨期和三级价格歧视潜力，并考虑消费者理性程度不同的三种模型版本。
We model the commonly used marketing practices of offering discounts to either repeat buyers (trade-ins) or new buyers (introductory offers) of a quasi-durable good. We analyze these practices in terms of their potential for intertemporal and third-degree price discrimination. In our two-period model, the monopolist sets a first-period price that segments the second-period market optimally into holders and nonholders of the good. In the second period, different prices are quoted to the two market segments. We present three versions of the model with varying assumptions on consumers' rationality.