Capabilities, Contractual Hazards, and Governance: Integrating Resource-Based and Transaction Cost Perspectives
研究了技术能力和契约风险如何共同影响企业的治理选择，发现强技术能力使企业在面对某些契约风险时仍能外包，而弱技术能力则增加分包可能性。
We address independent and joint effects of contractual hazards and technological capabilities on governance, arguing that strong technological capabilities improve a firm's ability to govern transactions, making outsourcing feasible despite certain contractual hazards. Examining a random sample of 405 service contracts from a single information technology firm, we found that contractual hazards encouraged internalizing transactions. Weak technological capabilities increased the likelihood of subcontracting, but strong technological capabilities had no independent effect. The latter had impact only in the presence of certain contractual hazards. These results illuminate why firms facing similar levels of contracting hazards organize their transactions differently.