Strategic Trade Practices in the Presence of a VER
研究在自愿出口限制造成不对称和不确定性的情况下，受限制和不受限制的出口商如何选择同时或依次行动，以及威胁程度如何影响领先者与跟随者的选择。
The authors investigate the choice of competing exporters to move simultaneously or sequentially when a voluntary export restraint has introduced both asymmetry and uncertainty amongst them. A restrained and an unrestrained exporter choose price strategically under the threat of a voluntary export restraint on the latter. Given the choice, firms adopt a sequential move strategy, but which leads and which follows depends upon the threat of the second voluntary export restraint. The restricted firm, thus, sells its full quota, even if this threat is low. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.