Information Aggregation in Polls
研究民调中选民如何传递信息，发现小样本民调可实现完全揭示，大样本民调中选民会内生分类为诚实中间派和策略极端派，并构建了考虑策略行为的估计量。
We study information transmission via polling. A policymaker polls constituents, who differ in their information and ideology, to determine policy. Full revelation is an equilibrium in a poll with a small sample, but not with a large one. In large polls, full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium where constituents endogenously sort themselves into centrists, who respond truthfully, and extremists, who do not. We find polling statistics that ignore strategic behavior yield biased estimators and mischaracterize the poll's margin of error. We construct estimators that account for strategic behavior. Finally, we compare polls and elections.