The Control and Performance of Joint Ventures
研究了合资企业中投票权分配和合同条款如何影响控制权配置，发现当一方接受董事会少数席位时，合同条款能促进合作并提升绩效；样本中合资企业资产回报率通常高于全资子公司。
We analyze the control and performance of assets operating in joint ventures (JVs). Control in JVs is determined by the allocation of voting rights and by the contracts that govern the JVs. This hybrid allocation of control seeks to reduce the potential for ex post opportunism. The results suggest that contractual provisions encourage collaboration and improve JV performance when one of the partners accepts a minority position on the board. The analysis also reveals that with the exception of JVs with contractual option provisions, assets operating in our sample of JVs generate higher returns than assets in fully controlled subsidiaries.