外部性内部化:购物中心空间的定价

Internalizing Externalities: the Pricing of Space in Shopping Malls

Journal of Law & Economics · 1998
被引 201
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究发现购物中心通过给知名主力店租金补贴、向其他店铺收取租金溢价,将主力店吸引客流的外部性内部化,主力店每平方英尺租金补贴不低于其他店铺租金的72%。

Abstract

Consumers are attracted to malls because of the presence of well‐known anchors—department stores with recognized names. Anchors generate mall traffic that indirectly increases the sales of lesser‐known mall stores. Lesser‐known stores can free ride off of the reputations of better‐known stores. Mall developers internalize these externalities by offering rent subsidies to anchors and by charging rent premiums to other mall tenants. We estimate that anchors receive a per foot rent subsidy of no less than 72 percent that which nonanchor stores pay. Anchors pay a lower rent per square foot in larger malls (with several department stores) than in smaller malls (with fewer department stores), even though sales per square foot of anchors are the same in the two types of malls. In contrast, the sales and rent per square foot of other mall stores are higher in superregional malls than in regional malls.

购物中心外部性内部化租金补贴锚定商店