Auction Form Preferences of Risk-Averse Bid Takers
分析风险规避的卖家在对称且风险中性的竞拍者参与的“标准”拍卖中，偏好哪种拍卖形式。研究发现，所有风险规避的卖家都偏好设置适当保留价的一级密封价格拍卖。
We analyze the preferences of a risk-averse seller over the class of "standard" auctions with symmetric and risk-neutral bidders. Assuming that buyers' private signals are independently distributed, we find that a sealed-bid first-price auction with an appropriately set reserve price is preferred by all risk-averse sellers to any other standard auction. In first- and second-price auctions, the more risk averse a seller, the lower the seller's optimal reserve price. Given two first-price auctions with reserve prices and entry fees such that both have the same screening level, all risk-averse sellers prefer the auction with the lower entry fee.