Procurement Policy and Contracting Efficiency
构建了一个两期采购模型，分析多种合同工具（如多次成本观测、完全承诺、自我选择和竞争）的最优性。数值例子显示竞争收益最大，但国防采购案例表明这些工具成本高昂，质疑了同时使用所有工具的合理性。
The contracting literature has emphasized the optimality of using certain contracting instruments, such as multiple cost observations, full commitment, self-selection, and competition. A two-period procurement model is constructed incorporating all of the instruments and optimal contracts are characterized. Numerical examples suggest that the marginal benefits of full commitment, self-selection, and multiple cost observations are small, while the benefits of competition are larger. To obtain some evidence on contracting costs, defense contracting is reviewed. It indicates that using these instruments is very costly, thus calling into question the optimality of using all of the procurement instruments. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.