Potential Insolvency, Market Efficiency, and Bank Regulation of Large Commercial Banks
探讨银行监管者与银行家对市场在银行监管中作用的分歧，研究大型商业银行证券的投资者是否以及何时因破产风险调整回报率。
Bank regulators tend to disagree with the idea that markets can play a role in bank regulation. The markets for bank securities are viewed by regulators as inefficient and lacking the necessary information to demand sufficient risk premiums on bank obligations to affect bank management decisions. On the other hand, bankers who have an active market for their securities tend to place faith in market assessments to determine the cost of management policies; therefore, they tend to think that the market plays an important role in “regulating” bank management decisions. The regulators are perhaps correct about the markets for small and medium–sized banks, but for those banks which have an active market for their securities, do investors adjust rates of return for the presence of increased potential of bankruptcy? If so, when does the adjustment take place?