Housing Rental Contracts and Adverse Selection with an Application to the Rent‐Own Decision
研究了房东无法观察租户住房利用率时产生的逆向选择问题，分析了市场均衡中自我选择约束对租赁合同的影响，并探讨了这些约束如何影响家庭的租购决策。
A model of rental housing is developed in which landlords cannot observe the utilization rate of their tenants. As a result of this imperfect information, an adverse selection problem exists where high utilization households have an incentive to conceal their type in order to obtain more favorable contract terms. Consequently, the market equilibrium must satisfy a self‐selection constraint, which imposes certain restrictions on the set of contracts that will be offered by landlords. These restrictions are examined in detail, and their implications for a household's decision to rent or own its housing are derived.