A Model of Involuntary Unemployment and Wage Rigidity: Worker Incentives and the Threat of Dismissal
通过不完全监督和解雇威胁解释效率工资假说，内生决定解雇规则和工资，发现均衡必然存在非自愿失业且工资对生产率冲击具有刚性。
This paper analyzes a model that highlights imperfect monitoring and the threat of dismissal as microeconomic underpinnings for the efficiency-wage hypothesis. The author's major innovation is to allow the rules for dismissal, as well as the wage, to be determined endogenously as the equilibrium of a Stackelberg game played between firms and workers. The key results are as follows: a nontrivial equilibrium (where positive output is produced) must involve involuntary unemployment in that employed workers are strictly better off than are the unemployed; in addition, the equilibrium wage is rigid with respect to exogenous shifts in productivity. Copyright 1986 by University of Chicago Press.