Games of Fair Division
研究在不可分割物品需分配给多个平等权利人、且可用货币补偿时，基于无嫉妒概念的公平分配机制，发现无嫉妒解不存在防操纵的选择，并分析了相关直接揭示博弈的均衡性质。
We consider the problem of fairly allocating an indivisible good to one of several agents equally entitled to it when monetary compensations to the others are possible. Our primary normative concept is no-envy. First, we show that there is no non-manipulable selection from the no-envy solution. Then we study the direct revelation games associated with subsolutions of the no-envy solution. The set of equilibrium allocations of any one of them coincides with the set of envy-free allocations for the true preferences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D63, D7l, D82.