Financial Intermediation with Risk Aversion
扩展了Diamond（1984）的金融中介分析，引入中介的风险厌恶。研究发现，即使中介风险厌恶，为众多独立回报企业家融资时，外部资金的代理成本仍较小；中介同时提供融资和保险，最优政策应将回报风险从风险厌恶企业家转移给中介或最终投资者。
The paper extends Diamond's (1984) analysis of financial intermediation to allow for risk aversion of the intermediary. As in the case of risk neutrality, the agency costs of external funds provided to an intermediary are relatively small if the intermediary is financing many entrepreneurs with independent returns. Even though the intermediary is adding rather than subdividing risks, the underlying large-numbers argument is not invalidated by the presence of risk aversion. With risk aversion of entrepreneurs as well as the intermediary, financial intermediation provides insurance as well as finance. In contrast to earlier results on optimal intermediation policies under risk neutrality, the paper shows that when an intermediary is financing many entrepreneurs with independent returns, optimal intermediation policies must shift return risks away from risk averse entrepreneurs and impose them on the intermediary or on final investors.