Advance Booking Discount Programs Under Retail Competition
研究两家零售商是否推出提前预订折扣计划，该计划以折扣价锁定顾客订单，但会降低利润率；分析四种场景下的均衡条件，发现唯一均衡是两家都推出该计划。
We model a situation in which two retailers consider launching an “Advance Booking Discount” (ABD) program. In this program, customers are enticed to precommit their orders at a discount price prior to the regular selling season. However, these precommitted orders are filled during the selling season. While the ABD program enables the retailers to lock in a portion of the customer demand and use this demand information to develop more accurate forecasts and supply plans, the ABD price reduces profit margin. We analyze the four possible scenarios wherein each of the two firms offer an ABD program or not, and establish conditions under which the unique equilibrium calls for launching the ABD program at both retailers.