Information, Preferences, and Public Benefit Participation: Experimental Evidence from the Advance EITC and 401(k) Savings
通过实地实验，发现降低信息、行政、污名和拖延成本使预支劳动所得税抵免参与率从0.3%升至1.2%，但结合401(k)储蓄激励时无额外提升，表明受助者主动放弃预支，可能与不确定性和短期强制储蓄动机有关。
Within a field experiment, I present a treatment group with reductions in information, administrative, stigma, and procrastination costs associated with the Advance EITC. The treatment increases Advance participation from 0.3 to 1.2 percent. Another treatment simultaneously encourages 401(k) savings, increasing 401(k) participation from 46 to 50 percent. However, there is no additional increase in Advance participation when coupled with the 401(k) treatment, casting doubt on a long-term forced savings motive. The results indicate that EITC recipients actively forgo the Advance. Further work is needed to identify what underlies these preferences. Possible explanations include uncertainty and/or short-term forced savings motives.