Grain Policy in Chinese Villages: Yield Response to Pricing, Procurement, and Loan Policies
评估了价格、收购和贷款政策对中国粮食经济的影响，发现价格和收购政策因地方官员目标冲突而无效，贷款政策能提高产量。
Abstract This paper assesses the effects of pricing, procurement, and loan policies on China's grain economy. A dynamic control model of the village leader is specified. Parameters of structural and control equations are estimated using time‐series cross‐section data. Simulation results show that pricing and procurement policies are not effective in raising yields, because of conflicting objectives of local officials. Loan policies can increase yields. The paper concludes that rural policies often have contradictory effects that can arise for a number of reasons. An important reason is the fact that local officials in a reforming economy have greater decision‐making discretion than higher‐level officials and execute policies to meet their own objectives.