Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market: Firms' Strategies for Recruitment and Retention
研究企业在随机匹配模型中发布复杂合同（如随任期增加工资）如何同时解决招聘和留人问题，并指出这会降低劳动力流动，低于有效匹配所需水平。
A common assumption in equilibrium search and matching models of the labour market is that each firm posts a wage, to be paid to any worker hired. This paper considers the implications of firms posting contracts, in a random matching model with on-the-job search. More complex contracts enable firms to address both recruitment and retention problems by, for example, increasing the wage with tenure. The effect on the labour market is to reduce turnover, below the level required for efficient matching of workers to firms. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.