The Information Content of Corporate Merger and Acquisition Offers
研究信息不对称经济中并购要约的信息含量，证明即使没有生产协同效应且支付溢价，并购仍可通过风险降低和信息不对称带来社会收益，并推导出并购溢价的数量界限。
This paper explores the implications for the information content of acquisition offers in an economy with asymmetric information. It is shown that mergers can be socially beneficial due to risk reduction and information asymmetry even when there are no productive syn? ergies and when positive premia are paid. The properties of equilibria with and without mergers are derived and contrasted in order to obtain a quantitative bound on potential merger premia. Theory is related to empirical evidence, where our results show that ag? gregate valuation gains can accrue on a purely informational basis. Moreover, the model developed here has important implications for the reported differences in tender offer and merger studies.