Implementation in generalized matching problems
研究了一类包含住房市场和婚姻问题的匹配问题中可实施的解，发现核心对应是可实施的，且任何帕累托有效、个体理性且可实施的解都是核心对应的超解。
We search for (Nash) implementable solutions on a class of one-to-one matching problems which includes both the housing market (Shapley and Scarf, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1974, 1, 23–28) and marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, American Mathematical Monthly, 1962, 69, 9–15). We show that the core correspondence is implementable. We show, furthermore, that any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable is a supersolution of the core correspondence. That is, the core correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable. A corollary of independent interest in the context of the housing market is that the core correspondence is the only single-valued solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.