A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations
分析管理者在任务分配上拥有自由裁量权时的影响。如果员工从执行任务中获得经济租金，管理者会承担过多任务并委派过少，即使使用最优产出合同也无法完全纠正，导致管理者自身努力过度而下属努力不足。
This article considers the implications of allowing a manager discretion over task assignment. If employees earn rents from carrying out tasks and the manager cannot 'sell' the jobs to her subordinates, she has an incentive to take on more tasks than is optimal and delegate too few to a subordinate. The author shows that, although firms can alleviate this incentive by offering output-contingent contracts, even with the optimal contract, (1) the manager carries out too many tasks, (2) she exerts too much effort on her own tasks, and (3) her subordinate exerts too little effort on his tasks. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.