Sovereign Defaults, Credit to the Private Sector, and Domestic Credit Market Institutions
研究了主权违约如何导致国内外对私人部门信贷下降，即使国内机构不持有主权债务，并发现国内金融制度质量会放大这一效应，有助于理解违约成本。
Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in foreign and domestic credit to the domestic private sector. This paper analyzes theoretically whether sovereign defaults can lead to this decline, even if domestic agents do not hold sovereign debt. It also studies whether the quality of domestic financial institutions affect the magnitude of this effect. In order to address these issues, the paper embeds the traditional sovereign borrower/foreign creditors relationship of the sovereign debt literature in a macromodel where widespread individual financial constraints limit a country's ability to reallocate resources. The paper finds that sovereign defaults can indeed generate a decline in foreign and domestic credit even if domestic agents do not hold sovereign debt, and that stronger domestic financial institutions can amplify this effect. These findings constitute a new step toward understanding the costs of sovereign defaults.