Corporate governance and incentives in German companies: Evidence from top executive turnover and firm performance
研究1980年代德国最大公司中管理委员会和监事会的更替与公司绩效的关系，发现管理委员会更替与股票表现差和负盈利显著相关，但与销售增长和盈利增长无关。
Abstract This paper examines executive turnover—both for management and supervisory boards—and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. Turnover of the management board increases significantly with poor stock performance and particularly poor (i.e. negative) earnings, but is unrelated to sales growth and earnings growth. These turnover‐performance relations do not vary with measures of stock ownership and bank voting power. Supervisory board appointments and turnover also increase with poor stock performance, but are unrelated to other measures of performance.