Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages
构建异质性劳动力市场模型，工人接受工资随能力递增，企业对工人禀赋信息不精确。因预期禀赋随工资递增，企业面对求职队列时不降薪，求职者降薪也不增加就业概率，企业可能同时招聘和解雇。
Models of a heterogeneous labor market are presented in which a worker's acceptance wage is an increasing function of his ability, and in which firms have imprecise information concerning the labor endowment of particular workers.Because the expected labor endowment of a hiree is an increasing function of the firm's wage offer, industrial firms may choose not to lower wages when confronted with a queue of job applicants. Rejected job applicants will not be able to increase their probability of employment by lowering their acceptance wages. Firms may choose to simultaneously hire and fire workers.