Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure
研究市场结构和执法如何影响走私和福利，其中走私通过合法销售来伪装。模型显示，若价格效应超过额外走私成本，走私可改善福利，且执法加强可能降低福利。
We examine how market structure and enforcement affect smuggling and welfare in a model where smuggling is camouflaged by legal sales. Conditions are given for when some, but not necessarily all, firms smuggle. With camouflaging, the market price is below the price when all sales are legal, so smuggling improves welfare if the price effect outweighs excess smuggling cost. This welfare effect is directly related to the degree of competition. Increased enforcement in this model potentially reduces welfare. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence on cigarette smuggling in the United States for 1975–1982.