An Outside Option Experiment
通过实验比较了两种预测讨价还价结果的方法：传统纳什解（将外部选项视为谈判破裂收益）与博弈论战略分析（认为外部选项仅在谈判者真会离开时才影响结果），实验支持后者。
In the economic modeling of bargaining, outside options have often been naively treated by taking them as the disagreement payoffs in an application of the Nash bargaining solution. The paper contrasts this method of predicting outcomes with that obtained from an analysis of optimal strategic behavior in a natural game-theoretic model of the bargaining process. The strategic analysis predicts that the outside options will be irrelevant to the final deal unless a bargainer would then go elsewhere. An experiment is reported which indicates that this prediction performs well in comparison with the conventional predictor.