Housing Assignment with Restrictions: Theory and Evidence from Stanford University's Campus
研究了限制区域住房（如斯坦福校园内仅限教职员工购买）的折价现象，发现其价格显著低于可比校外住房，并通过理论模型解释这一折扣源于质量与买家群体的匹配差异。
This paper studies housing markets where a subset of houses in a restricted area is available exclusively to a subset of “eligible” buyers. An empirical part shows that houses on Stanford campus (available only to faculty) trade at substantial discounts to comparable houses off campus. The theoretical part describes an assignment model with heterogeneous houses and buyers which predicts such discounts if the matchup of quality and buyer pools is sufficiently different inside versus outside the restricted area. The restriction can distort allocations by making eligible buyers choose either higher or lower qualities than ineligible buyers with the same characteristics.