Better Monetary Control May Decrease the Distortion of Stabilisation Policy: A Comment
分析了政策效果不确定性对政策制定者干预经济的意愿的影响，指出在存在可信度问题时不确定性有益，但若政策制定者拥有私人信息则不确定性代价高昂，最优不确定性程度取决于政策制定者的偏好和私人信息冲击的方差。
Higher uncertainty about the effects of policy instruments reduces a policymaker’s inclination to actively engage in shaping economic policy. If a credibility problem exists, then this is beneficial. However, in the case where the policymaker has private information about an economic shock, higher uncertainty is costly. Hence, the policymaker faces a trade‐off when he decides on the degree of control of monetary instruments. It is shown that the optimal degree of uncertainty about the effects of policy depends on the economic preferences of the policymaker and the magnitude of the variance of the shock which is private information.