Evidence of Demand for Index Insurance: Experimental Games and Commercial Transactions in Ethiopia
通过2010年在埃塞俄比亚提格雷地区小农中进行的实验游戏，发现参与者偏好高频赔付的指数保险，且商业销售数据也印证了这一偏好，表明贫困群体并非只选择最低保障。
We present results of experimental games with smallholder farmers in Tigray, Ethiopia, in 2010, in which participants in the games allocated money across risk management options. One of the options was index insurance that was the same as commercial products sold locally. Participants exhibited clear preferences for insurance contracts with higher frequency payouts and for insurance over other risk management options, including high interest savings. The preference for higher frequency payouts is mirrored in commercial sales of the product, with commercial purchasers paying substantially higher premiums than the minimal, low frequency option available. This combined evidence challenges claims that the very poor universally choose minimal index insurance coverage and supports concerns that demand may outpace supply of responsible insurance products.