序列创新的可专利性要求

A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation

RAND Journal of Economics · 1998
被引 245
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

研究序列创新中的专利保护问题,提出通过设定最小创新规模的可专利性要求,延长市场在位时间,从而激励研发投资并提高动态效率。

Abstract

This article investigates patent protection for a long sequence of innovations where firms repeatedly supersede each other. Incentives for R&D can be insufficient if successful firms earn market profit only until competitors achieve something better. To correct this problem, patents must provide protection against future innovators. This article proposes using a patentability requirement -- a minimum innovation size required for patents. A patentability requirement can stimulate R&D investment and increase dynamic efficiency. Intuitively, requiring firms to pursue larger innovations prolongs market incumbency because larger innovations are harder to achieve, and longer market incumbency implies an increased reward to innovation.

专利性要求序贯创新研发激励市场在位期