Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
分析了一个多期版本的斯彭斯就业市场信号模型，工人无法承诺教育选择，企业可随时提供工资。动态竞争与不完全信息导致多重序贯均衡，包括隐性合谋，并研究了当报价间隔趋近于零时均衡的极限性质。
This paper analyzes a multiperiod version of the Spence Job Market Signalling Model in which workers cannot commit to an education choice and firms make wage offers at any point in time. The dynamic competition combined with the incomplete information yield a multiplicity of sequential equilibria, including ones that sustain implicit collusion, even though the length of the game is finite. Emphasis is placed on equilibria that satisfy the "independence of never weak best response" criterion of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). It is shown that in the limit, as the time between offers tends to zero, any such equilibrium results (in expectation) in the unique stable outcome of the static Spence model.