Determinants of Interoutsourcing: An Analytical Approach
用数学模型比较相互外包与普通外包，发现相互外包能自动约束供应商提升服务价值，但在活动不匹配、激励过高或资金成本高时不如普通外包，为管理者提供决策参考。
ABSTRACT Interoutsourcing is a round‐way process in which the vendor is its customer's customer and the customer is its vendor's vendor. While interoutsourcing is emerging as a prominent outsourcing strategy in many industries, there are no rigorous analytical studies focusing on this mechanism. In this article, we analytically demonstrate the efficacy of interoutsourcing by comparing it with normal outsourcing. Our results show that, compared with normal outsourcing, interoutsourcing acts as a self‐enforcer of vendor firms' behaviors toward increasing outsourcing service value. However, in situations where there is a mismatch of outsourcing activities, a high degree of incentive that is based on outsourcing service value, and a high cost of capital, interoutsourcing is not preferred to normal outsourcing. We discuss these results in detail and provide managerial implications for firms involved in interoutsourcing decisions.