Competitive Price Discrimination
构建了一个企业直接向消费者提供效用的模型，分析寡头市场中价格歧视政策对利润、消费者效用和社会福利的影响，并证明在消费者有私人信息时，竞争性非线性定价的均衡结果是企业提供有效的两部收费制。
We model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers. The equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship π (u) between profit and average utility per consumer. Public policy constraints on the “deals” firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on π(u) .F rom this perspective we examine the profit, utility, and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework. We also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two-part tariffs.