Epistemology and the tasks of feminist economics
探讨当前认识论争论对女性主义经济学的影响，主张在过度确定论和削弱力量的相对主义之间寻找中间立场，既不放弃真理理想，也不否认价值和社会位置对研究的影响。
This paper examines the implications of current epistemological debates for the work of feminist economists. Feminist economists must acknowledge (in accordance with recent developments in the study of science) that (a) inquirers can never be certain whether claims about the world are true; (b) scientific inquiry is permeated with “internal” and “external” values; and (c) beliefs are affected by inquirers' social locations. But feminists should not, it argues, embrace the “relativist” stance of some postmodern thinkers, or reject the ideal of “truth,” or argue that beliefs are strictly determined by inquirers' identities and interests. It seeks to outline an epistemological “middle ground” for feminist economics, between the extremes of exaggerated claims of certainty and a disempowering relativism.