Client Importance, Nonaudit Services, and Abnormal Accruals
基于审计独立性经济理论，用客户费用占比衡量客户重要性，检验其与异常应计利润的关系，发现无显著关联，并进一步按盈余管理动机和公司治理强弱分组也未发现显著结果。
The economic theory of auditor independence (DeAngelo 1981b) suggests that auditors' incentives to compromise their independence are related to client importance. Using ratios of client fees and of nonaudit fees divided by the audit firm's U.S. revenues or a surrogate for the audit-practice-office revenues as measures of client importance, we investigate their association with Jones-model abnormal accruals. In a sample of 1,871 clients of Big 5 audit firms we do not find a statistically significant association between abnormal accruals and any of the client importance measures. Our theory development also suggests that auditor incentives to compromise independence should increase with the extent of client opportunities and incentives to manage earnings, and decrease with the strength of corporate governance and auditor expertise. We also do not find a statistically significant association between abnormal accruals and client importance in subsets of the samples partitioned by proxies for these factors.