A Theory of Credibility
建立模型分析一方如何判断是否信任动机不确定的另一方，指出可靠性只能通过行动传递，人们通过持续提供准确信息或有用服务建立声誉，从而变得可信。该理论为无约束合同的长期安排提供了依据，并描述了代理人利用声誉获利的条件。
This paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another, whose motives are uncertain. Reliability can only be communicated through actions. In this context, it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour; someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services. The theory provides a justification for long-term arrangements without binding contracts. It also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation.